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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this paper is to determine if macroeconomic policy convergence amongst 
member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is required for 
establishing and sustaining a free trade area (FTA). The paper also investigates whether a 
restraining mechanism is required in order to compel member countries to have compatible 
macroeconomic policies. 
 
The paper finds that macroeconomic policy convergence is not necessary for establishing an 
FTA, but is necessary for sustaining an FTA over time. The paper also finds that a credible 
collective agency of restraint against macroeconomic divergence must be created by SADC 
governments to ensure that SADC, as a free trade area is sustained. 





The question underlying this paper is whether the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) free trade area requires convergence in macroeconomic variables and policies in the 
member countries 1. This question applies both to the initial conditions for getting the free trade area 
started and to it being sustainable over time if and when it is established.  Behind these question lie 
another, namely whether the proposed SADC free trade area requires some mechanism, an agency 
of restraint [Collier, 1991], in order to force member countries to have compatible macroeconomic 
policies, and therefore macroeconomic conditions. 
Before addressing these questions directly, Section 2 considers the reasons for the enduring 
popularity of attempts to set up free trade areas in Sub-Saharan Africa, and their disappointing track 
record.  Section 3 discusses possible reasons why SADC might be an exception to this record.  The 
leading exception is Southern African Customs Union (SACU), so Section 4 examines its long (90 
year) history, and whether compatible macroeconomic policies were significant. Section 5 asks 
whether  a SADC free trade area will require macroeconomic policy convergence, while 
Section 6 asks whether a SADC free trade area could survive without it.  Section 5 concludes that 
macroeconomic policy convergence is not necessary for a free trade area to be established, but that it 
is necessary for it to be sustained, because several of the non-SACU members of SADC need to 
attract new investment in order to derive positive benefits from the free trade area.  Drawing such 
conclusions as are possible from the analysis, Section 7 discusses what type of institutional 
arrangement would create lasting macroeconomic stability, that would be convincing to investors, 






Why do African countries keep trying to establish regional free trade areas, or even continent-
wide free trade?  Why do they fail? Why has SACU endured?  And are there any reasons for thinking 
that SADC could be an exception? 
The public commitment of African governments, to the idea of regional or continent-wide free trading 
areas, dates back at least to the time when Ghana became independent.   President Nkrumah went 
out of his way to pay serious attention to those future African leaders who were leading the 
opposition to colonial governments, and thereby created great personal loyalty, together with an 
acceptance of many of his ideas.  One of the most prominent was Pan-Africanism.  Ever since that 
time, it has been virtually impossible to disagree (in public, and especially at African international 
meetings) with statements in favour of regional or Pan-African economic integration.  What is 
remarkable is not so much that this should have happened initially, but that devotion to regional trade 
areas and Pan-Africanism should have persisted for so long in the teeth of the evidence of its actual 
success.  In practice, there seems to be an acceptance that the rhetoric and reality shall be allowed to 
diverge, with African ministers making speeches in favour of integration at international meetings, but 
going back to their countries and failing to take the measures that would be necessary to make it 
happen. 
The history of regional free trade areas in Sub-Saharan Africa is that most of them have either failed, 
or have stayed in existence on paper with very little actual progress towards their objectives.  Within 
the (broadly defined) Southern Africa region, the failures include the Central African Federation and 
                                                               
 
1 In this paper, discussion of SADC does not include the Democratic Republic of the Congo or the Seychelles.  
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the East African Community, while the achievements of  the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) remain limited.  It has always appeared that some member countries of 
COMESA are less than totally serious about their membership, because of overlapping and 
incompatible membership of other regional organisations.  For example, it seems that Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda are more interested in re-establishing the East African Community, and that 
those members of SADC with overlapping membership in COMESA are waiting to see where their 
interest lies (Lesotho and Tanzania have already left COMESA, and Mozambique has suspended its 
membership).  Only SACU has endured, see Section 4. 
Judging by the rhetoric, African governments persist in believing that the creation of African free trade 
areas will generate economies of scale and therefore overcome the problem of small national 
markets.  Unfortunately, this is largely an illusion.  African countries can gain access to somewhat 
larger markets than available domestically, by creating regional trading associations, but such 
enlarged markets will be extremely small by wider international standards.  The Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa is a fraction more than 1% of global GDP.  
Perhaps more to the point, the GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa is of roughly the same order of magnitude 
as the GDP of Belgium, or the Netherlands.   
The point of this comparison is that those two countries have believed for many years that their 
economies are too small to flourish independently, so that they were among the founder members of 
the European Common Market (and before that had created the Benelux free trade area).  Moreover, 
both countries are relatively small geographically, with exce llent transport networks; almost exactly 
the opposite is true of Africa.  Communications between, for example, Swaziland and Sudan which 
are both members of COMESA, are virtually non-existent, and to the extent that they do exist are 
relatively unreliable and expensive.  In other words, expecting significant economies of scale from 
joining African economies into a single market is an illusion.  It is also significant that much of GDP in 
Africa is still generated by subsistence activity, which generates no monetary demand; and an above 
average proportion of monetary demand is for basic consumer goods such as food and clothing, in 
which economies of scale are not significant. 
A rather better reason for expecting benefits from regional integration, but one which is emphasised 
less in the publicly stated objectives in Africa than in Latin America [McCarthy, 1996: 216], is that 
even within quite small regional markets there should be an increase in competition.  In turn, this 
should lead to greater efficiency and a better chance in the long run of being internationally 
competitive. The smaller members of SACU have gained in this way from having to compete in the 
South African market.  Indeed, it has been argued that it is more realistic for producers in the BLNS 
countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) to test their competitive ability in the South 
African market initially, whereas they would not be able to graduate to competition in global markets 
without this stepping stone being available. 
A third possible benefit of regional integration is political.  The political and economic bargaining 
power of African countries might be strengthened if their voice came from regional or continent-wide 
organisations.  Of these, regional organisations are more likely to be effective, because of the 
extreme difficulty of achieving an agreed Pan-African view.  There is some evidence that regional 
groups survive, with good attendance at meetings from heads of state, so long as they achieve some 
diplomatic recognition and success, but fade away when such gains are small. This is said to have 
happened in the case of ECCAS, the Economic Community of Central African States [Lancaster, 
1995].  In this sense, SADC has been quite successful, although current disagreements over the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are undermining the past record of success in dealing with 
political disputes in SADC, and in individual SADC countries.   
 
 





Are there any reasons for thinking that a SADC free trade area might succeed where other such 
initiatives have failed, and in particular for believing that SADC is more likely to succeed than 
COMESA?  A great deal of the answer relies on the position of South Africa.  South Africa's GDP is 
about 45% of the Sub-Saharan African total, and 74% of SADC’s GDP (Nigeria's GDP is less than 
10% of the African total).  This makes the success of COMESA unlikely, because South Africa has 
chosen not to join, choosing instead to join SADC.  South Africa has not yet ratified the SADC free 
trade agreement, although President Mbeki said in mid-1999 that South Africa would ratify by January 
2000.  Clearly, the free trade area would be negligible without South Africa; it also requires the non-
SACU members of SADC to join if it is to be more than a reworking of SACU.  A reason why South 
Africa could eventually decide to ratify the SADC trade protocol would be in order to protect its 
existing markets in the non-SACU SADC countries, especially from Far Eastern competition.  On the 
other hand, South African manufacturers fearful of competition, from Mauritius and Zimbabwe in 
particular, may lobby successfully to prevent the free trade area from being established. 
While the smaller SADC members will no doubt continue to sell most of their exports of primary 
commodities to developed countries outside the region, it could be argued that a SADC free trade 
area would make it possible for them to develop non-traditional exports, mainly manufactured goods, 
by acquiring duty-free access to the South African market.  However, free trade might not be 
sufficient, because new investment would also be required.  These countries have had duty-free 
access for manufactured goods to the European Union for many years, but have not been able to 
take significant advantage.. 
They might also want to join because of evidence that the small members of SACU have grown faster 
than their neighbours.  Income per capita of the BLNS economies converged on that of South Africa 
from 1960 to 1989, whereas the economies of most non-SACU members of SADC did not [Jenkins 
and Thomas, 1997, Mauritius is an exception].  In other words, the BLNS economies responded as 
expected to the theory of economic convergence, namely that the lower the starting point in terms of 
GNP per head, the faster the rate of growth, when countries are in a free trading relationship.   
Some recent data on rates of economic growth in SADC are presented in Table 1 (for SADC GNP 
per head, see Appendix Table 2).3  The statistics in Table 1 are less convincing, in that the growth 
rates of the non-SACU members of SADC compare quite favourably with those of the small SACU 
members.  It should be noted that several of the non-SACU members of SADC suffered from South 
African destabilisation, most obviously in Angola and Mozambique where South Africa supported 
civil wars, but also in other countries which supported the struggle against apartheid.  The BLS 
countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) were less involved.   
However, the analogy may not be valid.  Creation of a SADC free trade area may not necessarily 
have the same effect on economic growth on the new members, as it had on the smaller members of 
SACU.  Firstly, the relative success of the small SACU countries could be attributable to their not 
having an independent trade policy, rather than to free trade with South Africa.  In other words, 
SACU acted as an agency of restraint in preventing BLNS adopting the trade policies which are 
believed to have caused the ruin of many African economies.   
Secondly, the starting point of the non-SACU members of SADC is different from that of the small 
SACU members.  The latter have always been exposed to competition within the SACU market, 
essentially competition with producers in South Africa , although they are protected by the common 
external tariff from non-SACU competition so that relatively few BLNS producers are internationally 
competitive.  Any producers setting up in one of the BLNS countries have to be able to compete with 
                                                               
3 Note that the small members of SACU grew faster than South Africa over a longer period, despite colonial neglect.  For example, 
their share of SACU imports rose from 1.3% to 4.1% between 1910 and 1965 
3. Might SADC succeed where other regional trade agreements have not? 
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imports from South Africa from their first day of operation.  There are some minor exceptions to this, 
in that some sectors are reserved for citizens, but these tend to be such activities as small-scale 
retailing, and taxi services.  Manufacturing is not a reserved occupation.  This means that 
manufacturers must be competitive with South African producers.  This has the advantage that some 
of these producers have been able to develop exports to South Africa.  Although exporting requires a 
higher degree of competitiveness than being able to compete with imports, because of transport 
costs, the transition from competing with imports to competing in the South Africa export market has 
proved a step that some producers have been able to take.  In addition, some manufacturers have set 
up in order to service the South African market, particularly in Lesotho and Swaziland [BIDPA, 1998]. 
 
 
 1980-89 1990-95 1996 1997 1998 
South Africa 2.2 0.6 3.2 1.7 0.1 
  Other SACU      
Botswana 11.0 5.0 6.6 7.2 8.3 
Lesotho 3.9 5.4 12.7 3.5 -8.6 
Namibia 0.8 4.2 3.0 1.8 2.6 
Swaziland 2.5 3.5 3.8 3.7 3.0 
  Non-SACU SADC      
Angola 4.6 - 0.4 12.2 7.3 1.3 
Malawi 1.4 3.5 9.5 6.4 3.1 
Mauritius  4.4 5.3 5.5 5.3 5.6 
Mozambique 0.4 4.9 6.4 14.1 11.2 
Tanzania 2.5 3.5 4.2 3.3 3.8 
Zambia 1.3 - 0.4 6.5 3.5 -1.9 
Zimbabwe  5.1 0.5 7.6 4.4 1.6 
Sources: Figures for 1980-89 and 1990-5 from CREFSA, 1998, which used IFS, World Bank, EIU and central bank annual reports.  
Figures for later years from IFS, the South African Reserve Bank website: Committee of SADC Central Bank Governors, and EIU 
Country Reports (in italics). 
There are some minor exceptions to the statement that all manufacturers in BLNS have to be 
competitive with producers in South Africa, because the SACU agreement allows for the temporary 
(up to eight years) tariff protection of producers in the BLNS countries.  But Botswana, for example, 
has only ever protected two producers in this way; they both failed.  As a result of this restraint on 
tariff protection, within SACU, the BLNS countries have not created protected monopoly 
manufacturers.  This was done in many other African countries, including several of the non-SACU 
members of SADC.  It had generally disastrous consequences, because the "infant industries" never 
succeeded in becoming internationally competitive.  In addition, those, which were state-owned, 
tended to make large losses. 
Exposing some non-SACU countries in SADC to free trade with South Africa could have a doubly 
damaging effect.  Firstly, their existing manufacturing sectors would be unable to compete with 
imports from South Africa, so that much of it would be driven out of business.  Secondly, their 
existing industry would not be able to take immediate advantage of access to the South African 
market, so that they would gain little or nothing from a SADC free trade area in the short term, and 
probably not much in the medium term.4 
In the long term, those economies and sectors of manufacturing which are currently uncompetitive 
regionally, might be able to sell to South Africa eventually, provided that other aspects of their 
economic structure and situation are favourable.  However, this would depend on their being able to 
                                                               
4 These adverse effects would be reduced if, as has been discussed, the lowering of tariffs within SADC were to be asymmetrical, with 
South Africa lowering its tariffs sooner and faster than the other members.  
Table 1:  Annual rates of growth of GDP in SADC, 1980-98 (%) 
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attract new industry capable of taking advantage of the free trade area in general, and of exporting to 
South Africa in particular.  Unfortunately, it would be likely that their acceptance of the free trade 
area would have disappeared and led to withdrawal before such long term benefits could accrue.   
The South African government has offered asymmetry, under which the non-SACU members of 
SADC would be required to reduce tariffs on imports from South Africa more slowly than South 
Africa would reduce its tariffs on imports from them.  But this would merely postpone the possibility 
of increased efficiency, and would do nothing to attract investment in manufacturing capable of 
exporting to South Africa. 
For these reasons, previously protected manufacturing sectors are in a quite different position to the 
manufacturing sectors of the BLNS countries, so that assuming the same advantages of free trade 
with South Africa would be wrong.  
Not all of the non-SACU manufacturing sectors in SADC would be adversely affected in this way.  
Mauritius has a competitive manufacturing export sector, and some sectors in Zimbabwe are capable 
of competing in the South African market, as shown by the unwillingness of South Africa to renew the 
bilateral Zimbabwe trade agreement. Either it has already happened, or they have not built up a 
protected manufacturing sector in the first place.  In Zambia, the country's trade regime has already 
been liberalised.  Existing manufacturing industry was unable to compete with South African imports, 
and was even less able to develop exports.  The increased efficiency that is supposed to occur upon 
opening up an economy to international competition assumes that producers will swim rather than 
sink, but many Zambian manufacturers sank.  So Zambia would not be much harmed by a SADC free 
trade area, because the damage has already been incurred; but nor would there be much expectation 
of gains from the export of manufactured goods to South Africa and the rest of SADC from the 
existing manufacturing sector.  
Mozambique did not built up a protected manufacturing sector, because of the war.  Much of the 
investment in its rapidly recovering economy (recent growth rates have been in double figures) has 
been premised upon trade with South Africa, and would not probably be damaged by the creation of 
a free trade regime.   
Malawi and Tanzania, and to some extent Zimbabwe (leaving aside Angola because of the war 
situation) do have protected manufacturing sectors.  That of Tanzania is probably doubly inefficient, 
because most of it was developed by and remained in the public sector. 
It can be argued that the non-SACU members of SADC cannot afford to be excluded from the South 
African market, and will therefore choose to join a SADC free trade area otherwise their exports 
would be subject to the common external tariff of SACU.  Although the common external tariff has 
been reduced, and is expected to be reduced further because of South Africa having joined the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) as a "developed country", the average tariff remains significant.  
Moreover, the non-SACU members of SADC are very conscious of their bilateral trade deficits with 
South Africa, despite the irrelevance of bilateral trade deficits in comparison with overall current 
account balances.  They might therefore see a SADC free trade area as an opportunity to reduce 
those deficits.  
It is possible, perhaps even likely, that these considerations will mean that SADC does indeed 
succeed in creating a free trade area, but it is less likely that it will persist because of the strong 
pressures towards disintegration that will exist.   
The most common reason by far for the failure of established free trade areas is a belief, correct or 
not, that one country (usually the more economically advanced) is getting a larger share of the 
benefits than accrues to other members.  In the more extreme cases, the majority of members believe 
that the supposedly favoured country is not only getting a more than acceptable share of the benefits, 
but that the other members are actually worse off because the favoured country is gaining at their 
M a c r o e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  a n d  t r a d e  i n t e g r a t i o n  i n  S o u t h e r n  A f r i c a  
  
7 
expense.  This was the case in the East African Community, which was founded in the 1970s, with 
Kenya cast as the villain by Tanzania and Uganda.   
Logically, the less advantaged members of a free trade area should choose to maintain it if they are 
better off than they would be without it, but in practice they do not if one member is perceived to 
gain more than the others.  If that was the case for Kenya in the East African Community, the 
expectation of it happening in a SADC free trade area must be several times stronger, because the 
economy of South Africa is not only totally dominant in size (roughly 75% of total SADC GDP), but is 
even more dominant in manufacturing capacity (nearly 85% of manufacturing capacity in SADC) and 
level of technical development.  To make matters worse, South Africa already has large bilateral trade 
surpluses with other SADC members. 
 Another possible reason for arguing that the dominance of South Africa in the Southern African 
economy might make a SADC free trade area an exception, to the record of failure of regional 
trading associations, is that the one successful example is SACU, which has existed for nearly 90 
years.  South Africa is of course even more dominant in SACU than it would be in a SADC free trade 
area. Therefore, examining the reasons why SACU has survived, and why it is currently being 
renegotiated, might throw some light on the prospects for SADC.  In particular, in the context of this 





The facts about SACU are fairly simple.  When it was first established in 1910, it was no more than 
a recognition of the status quo.  It may even have been thought of as a temporary arrangement prior 
to the absorption of the three small members into South Africa.  The Act of Union contained a clause 
saying that the three High Commission Territories would eventually be incorporated into the Union of 
South Africa.  Fortunately, the Act also said that this would not happen without the consent of the 
local people in each territory.  Although the British did almost nothing else for the three territories, 
they did prevent incorporation despite great pressure at times from South African governments, for 
example on Botswana through refusal to buy Botswana's beef [Hubbard, 1981]. 
Apart from establishing free trade within the four countries, and a clause guaranteeing free transit 
across each others' territories, the main significant element of the SACU agreement was the revenue-
sharing formula for the distribution of the revenues collected from the common external tariff.  Each 
member country received a percentage of the total amount of duty collected, based on the relative 
size of the four economies at that time, which meant that 98.69% went to South Africa.  The 
percentages were fixed, so that when the three smaller economies grew faster than that of South 
Africa, there was no matching increase in their share of the SACU revenue pool.  There was a 
readjustment in 1965 of the shares of the three smaller countries, but their combined share remained 
the same at 1.31% even though by that time their combined share of imports had risen to 4.1%. 
There was, throughout this period, a limited advantage to the smaller countries, in that their customs 
officers did not have to collect revenue on intra-SACU trade, but only on the minor proportion of 
goods imported from outside SACU.  After the renegotiation of the SACU agreement in 1969, 
customs officers had to collect statistics, on which subsequent claims for each country's share of the 
SACU revenue pool were based.  This increased the administration required, but still made fewer 
demands on the very underdeveloped civil service in each of the small countries than would have 
been made by independent national customs areas.  On the other hand, the common external tariffs 
were imposed exclusively in South Africa's interests, without consultation with the smaller members, 
to provide protection for South African manufacturers. 
4.  The significance, if any, of SACU 
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Why have the three smaller countries tolerated the total dominance of South Africa in trade policy 
(and huge bilateral trade deficits with South Africa)?  Until the 1960s they were so weak, both 
economically and politically, that they had little choice.  For the first 50 years or more of the SACU 
agreement, the High Commission Territories were ruled by the British High Commissioner in Cape 
Town, who paid considerably more attention to relations between Britain and South Africa than to 
the interests of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland.  As a result, the colonial power took almost 
no interest, and the territories themselves had completely negligible bargaining power.  It is probably 
significant that there was no upward adjustment of the BLS revenue share until after they had gained 
their independence.  Thereafter, the advantages of large customs revenues, with minimal 
administrative cost, outweighed the disadvantages, or appeared to do so.5 
The changes that were negotiated in 1969 were perceived to have shifted the revenue formula from 
a bias in favour of South Africa, to a bias in favour of the three smaller countries.  The revised formula 
was regarded as being relatively generous, and went some way towards compensating for loss of 
policy discretion, the price raising effect of the common external tariff, and the tendency of 
investment to be attracted to the core rather than to the periphery. It gave the three smaller countries 
a revenue share based on their share of imports and products subject to excise duties into the SACU 
area, multiplied by 1.42.  There was a further change in 1977, setting upper and lower limits (of 17% 
and 23%) on the average rate of revenue, which turned out to be favourable to the BLNS countries; 
the 17% minimum has been the effective rate for many years.  The significance of customs union 
revenue became very large, amounting to some 50% of total government revenue in Lesotho and 
Swaziland for example.   
The revenue formula has been criticised, on the grounds that at times of rapid growth the delays in 
receipt of increased SACU revenue were large enough to offset the benefits of the multiplier in the 
revenue formula.  Nevertheless, the smaller countries sought a new agreement, mainly because of 
South Africa's monopoly of decision making.  On the other hand, South Africa wanted a new 
agreement because it regarded the revenue formula as being too generous to the smaller countries.  
In particular, the revenue owing to BLNS does not decrease if the revenue pool decreases.  This has 
been happening, following the shift to VAT in South Africa and reductions in the common external 
tariff.  
It is roughly correct, therefore, to say that the two major issues in the current renegotiation of SACU 
are to reduce the bias in favour of the smaller countries in the revenue-sharing formulae, and to give 
the latter some say in tariff and other trade policy issues.  It seems likely that the unwillingness of the 
South African Government to relinquish sole control of tariff policy is a principal reason for the 
current negotiations failing to reach a conclusion, over an extended period.  On the other hand, 
South Africa has apparently been willing to contemplate a new revenue-sharing formula which would 
give roughly the same revenue to the smaller countries, but which would reduce their customs union 
revenue if the total paid into the pool were to fall.  In practice, that is exactly what is expected to 
happen, as a result of further reductions in the common external tariff to conform with WTO 
membership, and because of the new free trade agreement with the European Union.   
The latter would have a particularly severe effect on government revenue in Lesotho and Swaziland, 
and would have a significant effect on the other two countries as well [BIDPA, 1998].6 
Despite these difficulties and disagreements, SACU has lasted for a long time, very much longer than 
any comparable arrangement in the rest of Africa.  It is relevant therefore to ask whether SACU's 
                                                               
5  This was despite research showing that the price-raising effect of the common external tariff, net of the effect of the multiplier in the 
revenue formula, resulted in a net cost, in the case of Botswana of up to 3.25% of GDP over a period of four years in the late 1980s 
[Leith, 1992]. 
6 It has been estimated that the EU/SA FTA would reduce the current size of the SACU revenue pool by 31% if the protocol items (for 
example textiles and cars) continue to be protected, and by 51% if they are eventually imported duty free from the EU into South 
Africa.  This would reduce total government revenue in Swaziland by 14%, or 23% in the worst case.  The figures for the other 
countries are Lesotho (13/21%), Namibia (9/14%) and Botswana (5/9%) [BIDPA, 1998: 44]. 
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survival has depended on macroeconomic policy convergence, and whether the latter, if it has played 
a part, has depended on agencies of restraint.  
The history of SACU is relatively unhelpful in indicating whether macroeconomic policy convergence 
was significant in SACU's survival and therefore whether it would be significant for SADC.  For most 
of the period of SACU's history, the four countries used a common currency, that of South Africa.  
Namibia, when it became independent in 1990, joined SACU and continued to use the rand de 
facto.  Each of Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland has issued its own currency, but each national 
currency exchanges on a one-to-one basis with the rand, which is allowed legally to circulate 
alongside each national currency.  Only Botswana has made a significant break, leaving what is now 
called the Common Currency Area (formerly the Rand Monetary Area) in 1976.   
What this amounts to it is that Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are bound to have similar inflation 
rates to that of South Africa, because money and goods can flow freely between the four countries, 
and because the central banks of the three smaller countries have limited or zero powers to finance 
budget deficits by money creation.  With their exchange rates fixed at 1:1 to the rand, and inflation 
rates close to that of South Africa, they have very narrowly fluctuating real bilateral exchange rates 
with the rand.  Botswana does have those powers, but has had budget surpluses in the great majority 
of years since 1976, so that there has been no temptation to indulge in inflationary finance.  
Botswana did have a budget deficit of P1.5 billion (R2.0 billion, about 6.2% of GDP) in 1998/99, but 
the Government's accumulated financial surpluses at the Bank of Botswana could finance such a 
deficit for 12 years without domestic borrowing being necessary.   
Meanwhile, the Botswana government has consistently maintained a near-constant real exchange rate 
against the rand, as a matter of policy, so that trade between Botswana and South Africa (and to the 
very limited extent that it exists, between Botswana and the other SACU members) has not been 
disrupted by macroeconomic divergence.  The Pula has risen in nominal terms against the rand, from 
its initial value of R1 to its current value of approximately R1.32, but over the long term, inflation in 
Botswana has been less than in South Africa (see Table 2 in section 6.1), leaving the real exchange 
rate fairly constant.  Botswana is extremely unusual in not having abused the opportunities created by 
having its own central bank.  However, Botswana is also extremely unusual in having had such a 
favourable budget position for more than 20 years.  Appendix Table 1 shows some of the 
extraordinary currency depreciation that has taken place elsewhere in Africa in most of the countries 
which created their own independent central banks and monetary systems.   
Overall, the evidence suggests that the four smaller members of SACU have gained from 
membership, as suggested by the convergence of income per head.  The extraordinarily rapid 
economic growth of Botswana is attributable more to the growth of diamond exports than to 
membership of SACU; but the other small members of SACU have also grown faster than South 
Africa, and the absence of convergence in the rest of SADC (from 1960 to 1989) suggests but does 
not prove that SACU had a significant influence.  The absence of convergence in the rest of Southern 
Africa can also be attributed to civil wars, several of which were actively stimulated by the apartheid 
government. 
 Undoubtedly, the benefits within SACU were not hindered by the convergence of macroeconomic 
policy.  What cannot be said is whether similar inflation rates and other evidence of macroeconomic 
policy convergence were necessary for BLNS to drive benefits from SACU.  Moreover, it is not 
possible to know whether Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland would have abused the opportunity 
provided by independent central banks and monetary systems, if they had followed Botswana in 
leaving the Common Monetary Area.  It is arguable that they would have, based on the evidence of 
the majority of countries in Africa with independent central banks and no external agency of restraint 
(see Appendix Table 1).   
 
D P R U  W o r k i n g  P a p e r  n o  0 0 / 3 9  
 10 
10 
On the other hand, it could be argued that their governments have been fundamentally conservative, 
as shown by their unwillingness to leave the Common Monetary Area.  This indicates that they would 
have pursued conservative fiscal and monetary policies with independent central banks (in particular, 
Swaziland has pursued a very conservative fiscal policy, despite having negotiated a limited right to 
borrow from its central bank, see Harvey, 1998).  The experience of SACU, therefore, does not help 
in deciding whether macroeconomic policy convergence is necessary for the success of a free trade 
area.  A more general analysis of this question follows in the next Section. 
 
 
There are strong arguments that a common currency area requires macroeconomic policy 
convergence.  These arguments were accepted, for example, by the European Union in introducing 
the Euro.  It does not seem to be necessary, however, for similar conditions to apply to the 
establishment of a free trade area.  Again, the experience of the European Union supports this 
proposition, in that it was created, and proved sustainable, without macroeconomic policy 
convergence, and indeed with some quite weak currencies operating alongside very strong ones.  It 
may therefore be something of a coincidence that four out of the five countries in SACU are 
members of a common currency area; as argued above, it did not do any harm, but it is difficult to 
argue that it was a necessary condition for the sustainability of SACU. 
Countries in a free trade area can have different inflation rates, changing nominal exchange rates, and 
different levels of budget deficit.  However, if country A has a higher inflation rate than country B, it is 
essential that country A allows its currency to depreciate against currency B, since otherwise trade 
will be unbalanced by a changing bilateral real exchange rate between the two currencies.  If country 
A does not allow its currency to depreciate, its imports from country B will appear increasingly 
competitive compared with domestic goods, whose costs will have been driven up by domestic 
inflation.  Similarly, exports from country A to country B will become increasingly uncompetitive.  A 
bilateral current account deficit does not matter if the overall current account is in balance, or is 
being financed in a sustainable way.  However, if country A has a higher rate of inflation than its other 
trading partners, and does not adjust its nominal exchange rate to maintain a competitive real 
exchange rate, then its current account will not be sustainable.   
Secondly, as noted above, unbalanced bilateral trade may cause political difficulties for a regional 
trade agreement, even if overall trade balances are sustainable. Put slightly differently, countries in a 
free trade area should be willing in the short run "to abandon the use of the exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor (and/or a mechanism for delivering rents to favoured groups), and over the longer run, 
[must be willing] to exercise the fiscal restraint consistent with low inflation" [Oyejide et al. 1997: 5, 
summarising O'Connell 1997].  The benefits of a free trade area will be very much less, and collapse 
more likely, if bilateral real exchange rates are incompatible with the growth of two-way trade.   
There was a clear example of this type of problem in the early 1990s in the bilateral trade of 
Botswana and Zimbabwe.  Botswana is not only a member of SACU, but has a bilateral free trade 
agreement with Zimbabwe dating from 1956.  During the 1980s, Botswana's manufactured exports 
to Zimbabwe grew rapidly, to the point where Zimbabwe was importing some two-thirds of 
Botswana's total manufactured exports.  In 1991, the Zimbabwe dollar fell by 48% in US$ terms.  In 
the following year, Botswana's textile exports (the leading manufactured export category at that time) 
fell by 38% (in US dollar terms).  Interestingly, textile exports have subsequently recovered to their 
previous level (in real terms), largely by switching to the South African market, with which the bilateral 
real exchange rate is stable within narrow limits.7 
                                                               
7 Botswana chose not to end the bilateral trade agreement with Zimbabwe, despite the adverse change in bilateral trade.  During the 
1980s, the increase of Botswana exports to Zimbabwe induced the Zimbabwe government to close the border to trade between the two 
5.  Will setting up a SADC free trade area require macroeconomic policy convergence? 
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On the basis of the analysis to this point, a SADC free trade area may well be established. The driving 
force would be the widely held belief that regional trading arrangements are politically desirable and 
economically beneficial, and a desire not to have exports excluded from duty-free access to South 
Africa.   
However, a SADC free trade area will not have much chance of surviving, because a significant 
number of the non-SACU members of SADC do not have the capacity at present to increase their 
exports to South Africa.  They would need, therefore, to attract the investment in new capacity that 
would make such export growth possible, and this would require convergent macroeconomic policy 





It is argued above that some of the non-SACU members of SADC cannot at present expect to 
increase their exports to South Africa, because their manufacturing sectors are not regionally 
competitive.  If this is correct, the survival of a SADC free trade area will depend on those countries 
being able to attract new manufacturing investment.  This must be without tariff or other forms of 
protection within SADC, so that it is capable of being competitive within that free trade area.  In turn, 
this will depend on establishing a macroeconomic environment that is attractive to domestic and 
foreign investors, together with adequate infrastructure (functioning public utilities and transport 
systems).   
Note that the degree of macroeconomic stability that would be required is not as great as that 
established for the creation of the Euro, most notably inflation rates of 3% or less.  It will be sufficient 
for the non-SACU members of SADC to attain inflation rates equal to or less than that of South Africa 
(and the rest of SACU).  The latest inflation rate for South Africa is 4.6%, but it is widely believed that 
the underlying rate is nearer 7 or 8%.  The actual inflation rate is probably less important than 
maintaining a low and stable rate over an extended period, or in some other way creating the 
expectation in the minds of investors that it will be stable.   
This Section therefore examines progress towards this objective, and whether macroeconomic 
balance (if and when it is achieved) is not only likely to be sustained, but is likely to be perceived as 
credible and sustainable in the eyes of investors. 
6.1  The current degree of macroeconomic convergence in SADC 
In this context, the prospects for the survival of a SADC free trade area, if it is indeed established, 
have slightly improved since the 1980s.  A number of the non-SACU members have embarked on 
structural adjustment programmes.  This has involved liberalisation of the trade account, and 
movement towards more realistic real exchange rates.  However, not all non-SACU exchange rates 
are now market-determined, and there has been greatly varying progress in the reduction of rates of 
inflation, with some reversals.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
countries on more than one occasion.  It was reopened because Botswana was able to show that Zimbabwe had net positive earnings 
of foreign exchange from its bilateral trade with Botswana.  
6.  Will a SADC free trade area survive without macroeconomic policy convergence? 
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6.1.1  Inflation 
At one extreme, Mozambique's inflation was between 40% and 50% between 1980 and 1986, 
but was reduced to 5.5% in 1997, and prices actually fell (by 1.3%) in 1998.  This achievement does 
not necessarily give Mozambique's macroeconomic policy considerable credibility, because there is 
always the possibility of policy being relaxed and inflation rising to previous levels.  This is what 
happened in Zimbabwe, where inflation was anyway reduced only marginally, from 26% in the first 
half of the 1990s, to just below 20%, before it rebounded to its present level of more than 50%. 
 
 
 1980-89 1990-95 1996 1997 1998 
South Africa 14.6 11.8 7.4 8.5 7.0 
  Other SACU      
Botswana 10.8 12.5 9.8 8.6 6.7 
Lesotho 13.8 12.9 9.3 8.5 7.8 
Namibia 13.0 11.8 8.0 8.8 6.2 
Swaziland 14.2 12.7 12.5 9.7 7.5 
  Non-SACU SADC      
Angola - 870.3 905.3 111.2 91.1 
Malawi 16.8 30.8 37.6 9.1 29.7 
Mauritius  11.2 8.2 6.6 6.8 4.7 
Mozambique 45.1 47.5 45.0 5.5 - 1.3 
Tanzania 30.1 28.9 19.7 16.1 12.8 
Zambia 38.4 117.7 46.3 24.8 31.6 
Zimbabwe  12.8 25.9 21.4 18.7 31.8 
Notes: (1)  Figures for 1980-89 and 1990-5 from CREFSA, 1998, which used IFS, World Bank, EIU and central bank annual reports. 
(2)  Figures for later years from IFS, except those in square brackets which are from other sources, mostly EIU Country Reports, and 
may not therefore be comparable. 
Something similar happened in Malawi, with a sharp reduction in inflation in 1997 (from 38% to 9%), 
but a return to a 30% rate in 1998.  Zambia's inflation has been reduced from its triple digit levels in 
the first half of the 1990s, but remains above 20%  This appears to indicate a failure to implement its 
structural adjustment programme successfully, despite the introduction of a cash budget which 
should have eliminated all inflationary pressure from that source.  From the investor's point of view, 
Zambia continues to suffer from macroeconomic imbalance. Further details of inflation rates in SADC 
are shown in Table 2.  
6.1.2  Budget deficits 
Although SADC countries have at times suffered from imported inflation, the most common cause 
has been budget deficits financed by central banks (see Table 3).  There have been some  
improvements, but also some reversals.  Note however that there is far from being a one-to-one 
correlation between budget deficits and inflation, among other reasons because of pegged exchange 
rates, price controls, and other non-market factors. 
 
 
Table 2.:   Inflation in SADC countries, 1980-98 






 1980-89 1990-95 1996 1997 1998 
South Africa - 3.3 - 6.5 - 5.3  - 4.7 - 3.0 
  Other SACU      
Botswana + 7.7 + 5.7 + 9.4 [+ 4.3] [- 7.1] 
Lesotho - 5.9 - 4.5 + 2.9 + 1.7 [+ 0.4] 
Namibia - 13.5 - 6.9   -4.1 
Swaziland - 2.1 - 0.5 - 4.1 + 0.0 + 0.3 
  Non-SACU SADC      
Angola - 11.1 - 25.7    
Malawi - 12.3  13.3 - 5.5 [- 3.9] [- 4.0] 
Mauritius  - 6.2 - 2.9 - 4.0 - 4.0 [- 2.2] 
Mozambique - 23.5 - 25.5 - 17.0 [- 3.4] [- 3.9] 
Tanzania - 10.1 - 6.5 - 0.4  + 1.8 [- 5.6] 
Zambia - 15.1 - 12.4 - 2.6 - 1.9 - 4.3 
Zimbabwe  - 7.8 - 10.0 - 10.3 
 [10-12] (a) 
Sources: (1)  Figures for 1980-89 and 1990-5 from CREFSA, 1998, which used IFS, World Bank, EIU and central bank annual eports. 
(2)  Figures for later years from IFS, except those in square brackets which are from other sources, mostly EIU Country Reports, and        
may not therefore be comparable .  
Note: (a) Zimbabwe budget deficit for 18 months to October 1998 stated officially as 4.9% of GDP.  This excludes the cost of 
involvement in the Congo war.  EIU estimates the real deficit at 10-12% of GDP. 
There is evidence that over the 1970s and 1980s, the bilateral real exchange rates against the rand of 
the non-SACU members of SADC tended to return to earlier levels (of the 1960s, before inflation 
rates shifted upwards).  However, shorter term fluctuations have been very large, and in many cases 
returned to previous levels only after several years.  This tendency to revert eventually to some sort of 
equilibrium, even if it still exists, is therefore insufficient to establish favourable investment conditions 
[Harvey and Hudson, 1993]. Although previously overvalued exchange rates against the rand have 
been substantially corrected at times, considerable volatility remains, and in some cases real 
exchange rate depreciation has been reversed [Jenkins and Thomas 1998: 79-81]. 
A further problem, not evident from Table 3, is that the budget deficits are shown after the receipt of 
grants from donors.  From the point of view of short-term control of inflation, this way of presenting 
the data gives the right impression.  Grants in the form of foreign exchange make it possible to 
increase supply by paying for more imports.  They are therefore just as good as government revenue 
in reducing the inflationary impact of government spending.  However, heavy dependence on grants 
to reduce budget deficits may not be sustainable. 
Structural Adjustment Facilities (SAFs), and more recently Extended Structural Adjustment Facilities 
(ESAFs), were introduced in order to make it possible for developing countries to take longer in 
stabilising and restructuring their economies.  The repayment terms are an improvement, but the 
release of successive tranches of these longer term loans depends on success in meeting loan 
conditions at frequent intervals, for example quarterly.  Both Zambia and Zimbabwe have had IMF 
and World Bank support withdrawn for failing to meet this short term conditionality.   
 
 
Table 3:   Budget deficits as percentage of GDP, 1980-98 
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6.1.3  Aid and aid conditionality 
In recent years, virtually all donors have united with the IMF and the World Bank in withdrawing 
financial support from countries which do not have IMF/World Bank agreements, or where such 
agreements break down as a result of recipient countries failing to satisfy regular checks on progress. 
The credibility of macroeconomic stability in those SADC members heavily dependent on aid, 
depends on how likely it is that current levels of donor support will be sustained.  That depends, in 
turn, on recipient countries adhering strictly to both economic and political conditions.  Economic 
conditions now include not only such long-established indicators as inflation, budget deficits and 
interest rates, but also structural changes such as privatisation.  Political and political/economic 
conditions can include such issues as human rights, involvement in regional wars, and the 
reintroduction of controls (such as price controls and exchange controls) disapproved of by the IMF. 
The increased range of conditions may have been introduced for good reasons, but from the point of 
view of creating a favourable investment climate it increases the ways in which IMF/World Bank 
agreements can break down.  In turn, this has made investment more risky, and frequently so risky 




 1980-89 1990-95 1996 1997 
South Africa - 1.1 1.1 2.3 
  Other SACU     
Botswana 15.6 5.4 4.6 4.0 
Lesotho 21.9 15.4 11.8 11.6 
Namibia 4.7 9.1 9.6  
Swaziland 9.2 7.4 4.5 4.7 
  Non-SACU SADC     
Angola 8.5 21.1 18.9  
Malawi 55.9 79.2 75.5 50.0 
Mauritius  6.9 3.5 2.1 2.3 
Mozambique 59.3 143.4 103.2 [166.7] 
Tanzania 61.6 68.3 100.1 110.5 
Zambia 33.6 95.2 43.1 86.3 
Zimbabwe  15.9 21.4 12.9 [17.9] 
Sources: Figures for 1980-89 and 1990-5 from CREFSA, 1998, which used IFS, World Bank, EIU and central bank annual reports.  
Figures for later years from IFS, the South African Reserve Bank website: Committee of SADC Central Bank Governors, and EIU 
Country Reports (in italics). 
From Table 4, it is immediately obvious that Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia are 
desperately dependent on recurrent inflows of aid.  There are two ways of looking at this type of 
situation.  On the one hand, any breakdown of relations between a government and the aid donors 
could absolutely cripple the economy, so that even if inflation is currently low and macroeconomic 
stability appears to have been achieved according to other indicators, there must be serious doubts 
about its sustainability.  In other words, investors would tend to be wary of the longer-term prospects. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that in the more extreme cases of aid-dependence, with aid at 
more than 100% of imports, government simply cannot afford to disagree with the aid donors, 
because the economic effect would be completely devastating.  Such a very high degree of aid-
dependence would tend therefore towards a curious sort of in-built stability, created by the aid-
Table 4:   Aid as a percentage of imports in SADC, 1980-98 
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dependence itself.  However, it would take a risk-averse or politically naive investor to commit 
significant resources on the basis of this argument.  It explains why even those countries held up by 
the IMF as having pursued structural adjustment programmes successfully over an extended period, 
for example Ghana, have attracted very little foreign direct investment (other than in mining enclaves, 
with the export revenue deposited in escrow accounts abroad under the control of the foreign 
investor). 
Further problems about very heavy dependence on aid are firstly that aid tends to be tied, which 
sharply increases costs, and a high proportion of it (typically up to 50% in Africa) goes to technical 
assistance.  Both of these aspects of aid-dependence reduce confidence among investors.  Secondly, 
if export prices recover, for example copper prices in Zambia, there is a strong likelihood that the 
government will immediately abandon IMF-induced macroeconomic policies, and spend inflows from 
exports quite differently from the way that inflows of aid had to be spent.  This is again a source of 
instability, or rather a potential source of instability in the eyes of investors.  It means, therefore, that 
the IMF is not a credible external agency of restraint. 
The implications are not very attractive in the short term.  Aid-dependent economies need a sustained 
period of sound macroeconomic management, combined with a period of rapidly growing exports, in 
order to reduce their aid-dependence.  In addition, governme nts need to move from sound 
macroeconomic policies forced on them by the IMF, the World Bank and the other donors, to sound 
macroeconomic policies adopted willingly so that they are less likely to be abandoned as a result of a 
breakdown of donor relations, or a recovery of the country's traditional export earnings.  It is 
particularly hard for governments with a poor track record of economic management to create the 
necessary credibility, although, as with new management in a previously failing company, new 
governments have a slightly better chance of convincing investors of their commitment to new 
policies. 
In addition to those countries with aid-dependence above 40% of imports shown in Table 4, it would 
appear that Zimbabwe is also very aid-dependent, judging from reports in the press.  However, the 
economy does continue to function during periods when disputes between the Zimbabwe 
government and the IMF have not been resolved.  This suggests that the Zimbabwe economy has 
some capacity to respond to the opening up of South Africa as an export market.  This argument is 
supported by the fact that South African producers of textiles and clothing (and producers in some 
other sectors) have lobbied hard to prevent the renegotiation of the South Africa Zimbabwe trade 
agreement.  South African producers would not be so active on this issue if Zimbabwe did not have 
some capacity to export to South Africa at competitive prices. 
Of the other non-SACU SADC economies, Angola is obviously not in any position to attract 
investment in export manufacturing.  This apparently leaves only Mauritius of this group of economies 
to add to Zimbabwe as being capable of responding to the opportunities provided by a SADC free 
trade area.   
It is possible, though, that the Mozambique economy may have slightly greater potential than the 
other aid-dependent economies.  The reason for making this suggestion is that the Mozambique 
economy did not have a recent period of manufacturing development behind high tariff barriers.  Nor 
did it inherit monopoly state-owned manufacturing firms.  Essentially, most of the Mozambique 
economy was destroyed by the war, so that it is starting afresh.  In other words, Mozambique may be 
able to start to build up a new and regionally competitive manufacturing industry, without having to 
be concerned with how to get rid of old and inefficient firms.  It may be wrong, though, to make too 
much of this argument.  Despite the very rapid rates of economic growth in recent years in 
Mozambique, there must be a long way to go before Mozambique can take significant advantage of 
free trade with South Africa. 
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6.1.4  External indebtedness 
The other SADC economies either have severe macroeconomic instability, or a fragile stability 
which is highly dependent on aid inflows, or a much-disliked macroeconomic policy likely to be 
abandoned as soon as donor support is not necessary.  To this could be added the overhang of 
external debt, as another indicator which probably means that the highly indebted economies will 
find it difficult to take advantage of a new trading arrangement.   
 
 
  SACU    Non-SACU SADC  
South Africa 18 Angola 310 
  Other SACU  Malawi 76 
Botswana [14] Mauritius 45 
Lesotho  33 Mozambique  411 
Namibia [11] Tanzania 114 
Swaziland [19] Zambia 161 
  Zimbabwe 67 
Sources: World Bank World Development Report 1998/99: 230-1; figures in square brackets are external debt as a percentage of GNP 
from World Bank Global Development Finance 1999. 
6.1.5  Relevance of macroeconomic convergence to sustaining an SADC FTA 
The argument can be turned slightly on its head.  The currently very rundown economies in SADC 
need every possible opportunity to help them to recover, and grow past the levels (of income per 
head, delivery of public services, and quality of infrastructure) that they reached 10 or 20 years ago.  
One of those opportunities would be the opening up of the South African market.  The SADC 
economies have a significant advantage, compared for example with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, in 
having such a large economic neighbour, not just as a potential export market but as a potential 
source of manufacturing investment.  South African firms are far more likely to invest in such 
countries as Malawi and Zambia than non-regional investors.8  It is notable, for example, that most of 
the manufacturing investment in Botswana has come from the SADC region, with only a few recent 
exceptions (mainly Far Eastern firms prevented by quotas from increasing their exports of textiles and 
clothing to Europe and America). 
The issue then changes.  Instead of arguing that a SADC free trade area is unlikely to succeed 
because of the unattractive investment conditions in several of the key economies, it could be argued 
that opening up the South African market is a necessary if not a sufficient condition for economic 
recovery and growth in the region.  This potential contribution will be of little use if the SADC free 
trade area is abandoned quickly by those countries which perceive either that they have gained little, 
or that most of the gains have gone to South Africa.  The problem then is to find some way of making 
a SADC free trade area reasonably attractive to all its members in the short term, in order to give 
longer term benefits a chance of being achieved.  If the arguments above are correct, this means that 
a way must be found quickly to generate new investment capable of exporting to South Africa (and 
to a much lesser extent to the rest of SADC).  It cannot wait for individual countries to sustain sound 
policies for long enough to establish their individual credibility.  Those individuals SADC countries 
with a past history of instability would need many years of macroeconomic stability to achieve the 
credibility necessary for investment, acting on their own. 
                                                               
8 Some South African investment has taken place in recent years, notably in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, but relatively little of 
this investment is directed at exporting to South Africa. 
Table 5:  Present value of external debt as a percentage of GDP, 1996 
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6.1.6   What can governments do? 
There is nothing that governments should do directly, in the sense of investing themselves in 
export-oriented manufacturing (and other export-oriented activities, there are some services which 
might contribute).  African economic history makes it unlikely that government investments in 
manufacturing will be anything but a disaster.  Similarly, the history of directing investment to areas 
where it would not willingly go, whether within a single country, as for example "border" firms in 
South Africa, or within a regional trading area, is that it does not work.  The firms themselves struggle 
to make a profit without any subsidy, and multiplier effects do not emerge.  Some action is possible, 
for example investment in infrastructure; the South African Industrial Development Corporation has 
started on this.  The South African government has also raised the limits under exchange control rules 
of outward investment by South African companies in SADC.  Nevertheless, it is difficult for the South 
African government, donors or domestic governments to induce private sector investment in the 
SADC periphery if other conditions are fundamentally unfavourable, or if favourable conditions are 
seen to be unstable and therefore lack credibility. 
This brings the argument full circle.  The most effective government action, whether by individual 
governments or by a regional institution, would be to speed up the process by which sound 
macroeconomic policy (supposing that it has been established) acquires medium and long term 
credibility.  It has been argued above that the donors, led by the IMF, do not provide this where 
governments are seen as accepting unwillingly the macroeconomic and structural changes required.  
It is very difficult for individual governments to create such confidence, particularly where they are 
the same governments which pursued quite different policies in the past.  It almost certainly takes 
longer for individual governments to establish their credibility, than if they are locked into a collective 
and convincing external constraint.  The case of governments which are in open and acrimonious 
dispute with the IMF, a leading current example of which is Zimbabwe, really does seem impossible.  





It follows from these arguments that SADC governments must create a regional agency of 
restraint, by voluntary negotiated agreement, with credible sanctions against breaking its rules.  In 
other words, SADC as a free trade area would have to develop a mechanism for constraining 
macroeconomic extravagance, not necessarily in order to establish a free trade area, but in order for it 
to have a chance of being sustained.  This is essential for the non-SACU members to have a chance of 
attracting the investment that would enable them to take advantage of intra-SADC trade.  Otherwise, 
a SADC free trade area will swiftly collapse.   
The most obvious sanction would be loss of membership.  Of itself, this might not be very 
threatening.  However, if it meant exclusion from the South African market and South African 
investment, then it might be effective.  Macroeconomic policy convergence may not be strictly 
necessary for countries within a regional trading arrangement to trade with each other using their 
existing economic capacity.  The argument of this paper is that macro convergence around low  rates 
inflation, with stable real exchange rates, is necessary where member countries do not have the 
economic capacity to take immediate advantage of new trading opportunities.  Without this, they will 
not get their share of the short term benefits, and the free trade area will quickly fall apart.  In order to 
create that capacity, private sector investment is necessary.   
7.  Conclusion: the need for a voluntary, collective, intra-SADC agency of restraint 
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The necessary investor confidence will take a long time to establish for individual countries, so the 
process must be accelerated.  The potential benefits of a regional free trade area can only be secured 
if a credible collective agency of restraint is established by the SADC governments themselves.  Other 
mechanisms might be able to contribute.  For example, some form of partial investment guarantee to 
reduce the risks of South African investment in the SADC periphery could be positive.  Such a 
scheme might attract donor support.  
It would be absolutely essential that a SADC agency of restraint, and its sanctions, be negotiated and 
accepted through conviction by the SADC member governments.  Forcing governments into such an 
arrangement, whether using the muscle of the IMF or the regional dominance of South Africa, would 
not work.  
Achieving voluntary agreement on the rules and sanctions necessary for macroeconomic stability in 
member countries, based on governments being convinced of their benefits, would probably take 
much longer than an agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate tariff barriers within SADC.  This 
paper argues, however, that it is essential to set up such a collective agency of restraint, with credible 
sanctions, and therefore that the delay would be a price worth paying.  Otherwise, a SADC free trade 
area will suffer the fate of other free trade areas in Sub-Saharan Africa; and a failed attempt would set 
back future attempts at regional integration by many years.  It has taken more than 20 years for an 
attempt to be made to re-establish the East African Community. 
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Country   Units/$  Units/$  Ratio   
    1962   1998       1998/1962   
Liberia  1.00 1.00 1.00 
CFA Franc 246.85 566.42 2.29 
Ethiopia 2.4845 6.99 2.81 
Mauritius 4.758 24.43 5.13 
Gambia 1.784 10.22 5.73 
Botswana  0.7143 4.68 6.55 
Kenya 7.143 59.9 8.39 
LNS 0.7143 6.27 8.78 
South Africa 0.7143 6.27 8.78 
Zimbabwe 0.7143 27.75 38.85 
Malawi 0.7143 39.63 55.48 
Sierra Leone 7.143 1550 216.99 
Sudan 0.348 182.6 524.71 
Nigeria  0.7143 566.42 792.97 
Tanzania 0.7143 657.7 920.76 
Congo (DRC) 64 137500 2148.44 
Zambia 0.7143 2002 2802.74 
Ghana 0.7143 2322 3250.73 
Somalia 0.7143 2620 3667.93 
Uganda (a) 7.143 127700 17877.64 
Note: (a) actual rate for Uganda 1998: 1277 New Shillings (NS)/US Dollar; 1NS = 100 old shillings. 
Source: International Financial Statistics; African Business October 1998 
Appendix 
Appendix Table 1: Increase in the cost of a US $ 1962-1998 (selected African countries) 







 1980-89 1990-95 1996 1997 
South Africa 2275 2908 3140 3140 
  Other SACU     
Botswana 1218 2763 2903 3036 
Lesotho 450 592 670 679 
Namibia 1430 1938 2080 2076 
Swaziland 889 1133 1147 1161 
  Non-SACU SADC     
Angola 843 623 340 352 
Malawi 171 203 206 213 
Mauritius  1409 2947 3690 3840 
Mozambique 131 87 90 96 
Tanzania 262 143 130 130 
Zambia 454 400 430 433 
Zimbabwe  719 597 620 633 
Notes: as for Table 1; 1997 calculated using growth rates from Table 1, adjusted for population growth. The Democratic Republic of 
the Congo and the Seychelles have been omitted from this table, and from discussion in the paper.  The Congo remains irrelevant 
while the war continues, and the Seychelles is too small to make much difference to the argument. 
 
Appendix Table 2.  GNP per head in SADC, 1980-98 
